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THE INTERNET IS FOR
DISCRIMINATION:
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND
THEORETICAL HURDLES FACING THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT ONLINE
Everyone's a little bit racist, it's true.
But everyone is just about as racist as you!
The song Everyone's a Little Bit Racist from the popular
Broadway musical Avenue Q proclaims, axiomatically, that
"[elveryone makes judgments . . . based on race. . . . [n]ot big
judgments, like who to hire or who to buy a newspaper from ... just
little judgments like thinking that Mexican busboys should learn to
speak . . . English !",2 It teaches a troubling lesson that, despite
superficial equality of opportunity, structural racism remains
embedded in our society. The show takes a farcical view of the
dilemma, and it proposes a solution: "If we all could just admit that
we are racist a little bit, and everyone stopped being so P.C., maybe
we could live in-harmony!"3
The comedic song likely does not purport to make a serious policy
statement addressing American racism; nonetheless, the message it
sends is problematic. The song suggests that, instead of refraining
from making racist jokes and using racial epithets, we should embrace
such language. Racist speech, however, harms society both in a
rhetorical sense, through discourse, and in economic terms by
paralyzing-or at least stifling-a significant number of marketplace
players. Hate speech in general, however, is not the focus of this
Note. Rather, this Note specifically addresses the conflict between the
Fair Housing Act4 and the Communications Decency Act,5 as well as
O oRIGINAL CAST, Everyone's a Little Bit Racist, on AVENUE Q (RCA Victor 2003).
2 Id. (second alteration in original).
3 Id.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
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other problems facing enforcement of the Fair Housing Act's
advertising provision6 in the context of online housing forums-an
otherwise logical place to apply that provision.
In passing Title Vm of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, better known
as the Fair Housing Act or the FHA, Congress aimed to combat one
facet of the rampant racial discrimination that characterized the
post-World War II era.8 Housing discrimination took the forms of
racial steering, "blockbusting," racially motivated zoning laws,
outright refusals to rent, sell, or buy properties based on racial bias, as
well as unfair financing practices, such as neighborhood and racial
redlining.9 Beyond the obvious aim of ending invidious
discrimination, Congress hoped to further the goal of eliminating
racial ghettos in favor of "truly integrated and balanced"
communities.' 0
In light of Congress's integration goal, an especially important
provision of the FHA is the prohibition against discriminatory
advertising." Discriminatory advertisements are problematic, both in
housing and in other contexts,12 because they engender dual injuries.
First, using discriminatory advertising causes indignity similar to that
resulting from a denial based on race. Second, and more importantly,
expressing bias and intolerance in media outlets furthers the
discrimination that the FHA is meant to prevent by creating an
intolerant space. Moreover, because the media serves an important
community-building function in addition to its function as an
information disseminator, the FHA's advertising prohibition is
integral to achieving Congress's goal of encouraging integrated
communities.13
5 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
6 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
7 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3619 (2006)).
8 While this Note tends to address racism, rather than other forms of discrimination
banned under the FHA, many of the principal arguments addressed here apply to those areas as
well.
9 See 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (calling the post-World
War I era a "sordid story" in which "[federal agencies encouraged, assisted, and made easy the
flight of white people from the . . . cities of . .. America, leaving behind only [black people]"
unable to take advantage of the agencies' policies).
10 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (making it unlawful to "make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement . . . indicat[ing] any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin").
12 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-3(b) (2006) (prohibiting "notices or advertisements indicating
prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination" regarding employment).
13 See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing ghettoization and the
492 [Vol. 60:2
2010] THE INTERNET IS FOR DISCRIMINATION 493
That important provision is in some danger of losing its teeth, and
perhaps slowly being eviscerated, on account of an unexpected and
seemingly unrelated statute-the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA").14 The CDA provides, among other things, that "no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 5 This provision has been interpreted
to broadly immunize providers of interactive computer services-
Internet/Online Service Providers ("ISPs" and "OSPs"),' 6 Web hosts,
and the like-against actions in which traditional media could be held
liable. 7 State and federal courts have held ISPs immune from suit in
cases involving state law tort actions 8 as well as state and federal
statutory causes of action.' 9 The sweeping immunity courts have
interpreted the CDA to provide to most recoverable defendants,
whose content and conduct would otherwise be actionable, coupled
with the increasing use of online housing forums for purposes of
reinforcement mechanisms in which racial slurs operate).
14 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
1 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
16 For simplicity, this Note will refer to the whole class of defendants immunized under
the CDA as "ISPs."
17 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
CDA barred aggrieved user's defamation claims against AOL, which arose from messages
posted by an unidentified third party). As will be further discussed in Part IV.B below, explicitly
defining ISPs and OSPs as something other than "publishers" as a matter of law, see 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1), may make some sense. But the immunity that the CDA's definition might still
provide is problematic in light of the tangible results that virtual communication can engender.
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the Act provided full immunity to Matchmaker.com when a third party provided the content
essential to plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim and other claims, despite the Web site's "but
for" causal relationship to the plaintiffs receipt of sexually explicit phone calls, letters, and
hand-delivered notes).
'8 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the editor of an email
newsletter was immune from a libel suit under section 230 of the CDA, despite his editorial
responsibilities and his act of forwarding defamatory statements about a newsletter recipient to
other recipients); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(holding MySpace immune under the CDA in an action by the parent of a minor MySpace user
alleging negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation on the grounds
that MySpace either knew or should have known sexual predators were using its services to
contact minors and reacted inappropriately). But see Grace v. eBay, Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192
(App. Ct. 2004) (concluding that CDA did not afford eBay immunity in a libel action where
eBay knew of defamatory and possibly false statements posted by one user about another and
did nothing to resolve the problem).
19 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Craigslist, a provider of online classifieds, was immune
from plaintiffs' FHA claim alleging discriminatory advertising because it was not an
"information content provider" under the CDA); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that GTE, an ISP, was not liable under provisions of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520 (2000), for postings by one of its
customers displaying images of plaintiff athletes unclothed without their consent).
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locating roommates and potential renters of property,20 may create an
online "safe haven" for housing discrimination.2 1 Such immunity for
ISPs, combined with the fact that individual users are generally either
anonymous or non-recoverable, is likely to result in real injury with
no adequate means of redress.22
While the actual merits of FHA claims against interactive service
providers based on online housing advertisements may be in doubt,23
the broad immunity provided to ISPs by the CDA is still problematic.
While it is not one of the FHA's explicit purposes,24 the advertising
provision has collateral importance as a prophylaxis against the use of
communication tools for building racist and otherwise intolerant
25
communities.5 That forums calling themselves "classifieds" 26 exist
that are untouchable using the FHA may allow for the construction of
a semi-chaotic, racist and otherwise intolerant online community.
Moreover, given the fact that Craigslist alone registers over twenty
billion page views per month,27 the same indignity injuries that would
be actionable under the FHA if perpetrated by advertisers using the
New York Times likely occur many times daily in the online forum.2 8
20 See, e.g., Craigslist Classifieds: Jobs, Housing, Personals, For Sale, Services,
Community, Events, Forums, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2010); see also
Craigslist, About > Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Feb. 11,
2010) (indicating that: (1) over 50 million people use Craigslist each month; (2) it registers over
20 billion page views per month; (3) its forums serve all 50 states and over 70 countries; and
(4) it receives over 50 million new classified ads per month).
21 See Jeffrey M. Sussman, Student Article, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for
Housing Discrimination, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 194 (2007).
22 See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657 (explaining that the default judgment of $500 million
dollars was essentially non-recoverable against users who posted images of the unclothed
plaintiff athletes without their consent, and chiding plaintiffs for appealing the district court's
CDA immunity decision in pursuit of their claims against GTE, which the court deemed a
search for the "deep pockets").
2 See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (Easterbrook, C.J.) (expressing some doubt whether any
theory of causation could allow liability against Craigslist for "caus[ing] to be made, printed, or
published," any discriminatory ads, and observing that Craigslist no more caused to be made its
users' posts than "people who save money 'cause' bank robbery, because if there were no banks
there could be no bank robberies" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006))).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
2 See 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (indicating that the FHA
would further the goal of racial integration). Congressional desire to further racial integration
can easily be analogized to further the integration of the other FHA-protected classes.
26 See, e.g., Craigslist Classifieds: Jobs, Housing, Personals, For Sale, Services,
Community, Events, Forums, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
27 Craigslist, About > Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010).
2 Because online forums function differently from the New York Times or the Cleveland
Plain Dealer, a reasonable person who is a member of a protected class under the FHA may not
feel the same indignity when viewing a discriminatory advertisement in an online forum than
she would viewing the same ad in the Plain Dealer. Even if the measure of the indignity injury
is not as great, however, the sheer breadth of Craigslist's audience and billions of page views
suggests that the indignity may be multiplied. Moreover, an objective analysis of the rhetorical
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This Note argues that the Communications Decency Act's
immunity provision for ISPs against claims under the FHA's
advertising provision not only creates a "safe haven"29  for
discriminatory housing advertising and practices but also engenders
an online community in which intolerant and destabilizing language
has a palpable effect in furthering illegal activity and defeating the
positive community-building aspects of the FHA's advertising
provision. This Note further argues that the use of discursive analysis
in this context would be helpful for redrafting the Fair Housing Act so
that FHA claims against recoverable defendants, such as Craigslist,
Roommates.com, and others, may be viable.30
Part I discusses the congressional purposes in enacting the Fair
Housing Act and the Communications Decency Act, and examines
whether the two Acts are at cross purposes. Part II analyzes the merits
of an FHA claim based on discriminatory advertisements posted to
Craigslist-like forums, and entertains the notion that, despite so much
commentary about saving the FHA from obsolescence in an online
world, a claim against a company operating as Craigslist does may
substantively lack merit. Part IH will first apply community-building
theories to communication over the Internet and will then address
how application of these theories supports the need for the viability of
FHA claims in the "Craigslist" context. Finally, Part IV addresses
other proposals to save the FHA in cyberspace and concludes that,
while amending the CDA may be the most obvious "quick-fix" to this
problem, only an amendment to the FHA itself will assure that claims
against Web hosts like Craigslist can survive a motion to dismiss.
I. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IN CONFLICT WITH THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT
In the era of Craigslist and Roommates.com, a huge amount of
communication in the form of "notice[s], statement[s], . . . [and]
power of online forums should not be totally a game of comparing the relatively new medium
with traditional media. See infra Part II (discussing the discursive and rhetoric power of the
media and advertising).
29 Sussman, supra note 21, at 194.
3 In Chicago Laywers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., Judge
Easterbrook explained that Craigslist is a small company, employing only about thirty people.
519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). His commentary suggested that, even if the company is the
only readily identifiable defendant in many of these cases, meaningful relief may still be
unavailable in a suit against them without forcing Craigslist either to close down its site or to
drastically increase rates. See id. It might be then that if the FHA's advertising provision and
similar statutes could get to Craigslist and other ISPs, the Internet landscape would be
drastically altered.
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advertisement[s]" 3' regarding the sale or rental of housing passes over
the Internet.32  With the immunity provided under the
Communications Decency Act, 33 unless the companies operating
these Web sites affirmatively involve themselves in the production of
the discriminatory content,34 the companies will be free to create
forums wherein the activity specifically proscribed by the Fair
Housing Act may be done with relative impunity.35
A. The Fair Housing Act
1. Enactment, Purposes, and Provisions
The Fair Housing Act had its genesis in a proposal by President
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966 that urged Congress to pass further
expansions of civil rights legislation.3 6 The House passed an amended
version of the President's proposal in 1966.37 In August 1967, debate
began on Senator Walter Mondale's proposal, S. 1358, which would
successfully become fair housing legislation 38 as the Fair Housing
Act.39 S. 1358 put forward an ambitious plan that would eventually
cover all available housing in the United States. The law would have
approached the problem of unfair housing "in three stages," applying
those standards "first to all federally-assisted housing; then to all
31 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
32 See Craigslist, About > Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010) (providing specific data on how often and how much Craigslist users post and
view advertisements through the Web site).
3 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
3 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d
1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recognizing ISP immunity under the CDA insofar as the
ISP is not an "information content provider," but holding that defendant's degree of control over
the content posted by its users made Roommates.com an information content provider that could
be held liable under the FHA if the plaintiffs' FHA claims proved meritorious on remand).
3 Cf Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that, if GTE was
immune, the $500 million jury award could likely never be collected because there was "little
prospect" of locating the remaining defendants, so the individuals who posted the videos were
effectively able to violate the plaintiffs' privacy, contrary to established federal law, without
facing any legal ramifications).
3 Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look
at the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 197 (2001)
(citing Special Message to the Congress Proposing Further Legislation to Strengthen Civil
Rights, I PUB. PAPERS 461, 467-69 (Apr. 28, 1966)).
37 See 112 CONG. REC. 18, 112 (1966). The amended version included exemptions for
private clubs, religious organizations, and properties with less than four rental units if the owner
occupies one of them ("Mrs. Murphy"). See id.; Schwemm, supra note 36, at 202.
38 Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149 (1969) (citing Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., I st Sess. (1967)).
3 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3619 (2006)).
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multi-unit housing, and finally to all single-family residences."4o The
bill faced strong opposition from southerners and conservatives, who
presented several arguments against it: the tired one for the
inalienability of property rights; a slightly more plausible argument
that the bill amounted to "forced housing" legislation, coercing white
individuals to live in proximity with minorities; and, of course,
arguments that respect for states' rights precluded this form of federal
legislation.41 Of course, as Mondale's bill moved forward in the
Senate, it took on amendments limiting its scope.42 Although the FHA
was ultimately more limited than supporters initially hoped, the
organization and tenacity of Senate liberals, the release of the Kerner
Commission Report, ("Kerner Report"), and likely the assassination
of Martin Luther King, Jr. would push Senator Mondale's bill into
law.43
4 Dubofsky, supra, note 38, at 149-50.
41 See id. at 152-53. The inalienability argument was "tired" by that point in light of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which held that court enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. See id. at 20.
42 See, e.g., Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 156-57 (noting that one of the changes included a
one-year delay in application to all private, non-exempt dwellings); Schwemm, supra note 36, at
204-05 (same). One of those limits is the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemption, which excuses
from FHA liability single-family homes sold by the owner or owner-occupied dwellings with
four or fewer units. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1); see also 112 CONG. REc. 18, 112. For criticism of
the exemption, see generally James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the
Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605 (1999). The
amendment process also eliminated most of the proposed enforcement powers for the Secretary
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 157.
Note that the HUD's primary role under the FHA is supervisory in nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608
(2006). The law ultimately passed provides that private complaints may be filed with the HUD
and the HUD may bring enforcement actions on the basis of those private complaints, see 42
U.S.C. § 3610, but it does not bestow upon the Department any independent enforcement or
regulatory power. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608. The HUD had some investigative and enforcement
powers, but only where state and local fair housing laws and procedures were substantially the
same as under the federal Act. See Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The
Enforcement Provisions of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
59, 75-77 (1993) (discussing the HUD's limited powers under the 1968 Act). The executive
power to directly enforce the FHA without a private cause of action or on account of deficient
state procedures lies with the Attorney General, who may bring suits alleging a pattern or
practice of discrimination in housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3614. The FHA therefore is largely dependent
on private litigation via petitions to HUD and the efficacy of state and local enforcement
agencies to effect its goals. See Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 157.
43 See Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 149, 158; see also Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The
Forty-Year "First Step": The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban
Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1617, 1623 (2007) (identifying the NAT'L COMM'N ON CIVIL
DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) [hereinafter KERNER
REPORT] as a major source of support for Senators Mondale and Brooke because of the
connection it drew between civil unrest among inner city blacks and lack of access to adequate
and integrated housing). The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. aided in pushing the bill
through the House of Representatives, though passage in the Senate predated that tragic event.
See Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 158. Many commentators suggest that the FHA would have
languished in House committees for years, and may never have passed, if Dr. King had not been
assassinated. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair
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Supporters of the Fair Housing Act identified, not only the broad
policy goals of integration and cross-racial understanding as factors
favoring the Act, but also the practical concern that militants-both
black separatists and white racists-might exwloit racial
misunderstandings to incite racially motivated violence. The Kerner
Report proved helpful because it demonstrated a practical need for the
legislation beyond the "mere" rhetoric of substantive equality-that
is, combating race riots and public outrage.45 In order to begin to quell
the civil unrest among black Americans that characterized the 1960s,
the Commission recommended a "national, comprehensive and
enforceable open-occupancy law" to pursue integrated suburban-
and, ultimately, urban-communities to replace urban black and
suburban white ghettos.46
The Commission recommended that government action focus on
three main objectives: "[1] eliminating barriers to choice
(antidiscrimination); [2] removing the frustration of powerlessness
(empowerment); and [3] increasing contact across racial lines to
destroy stereotypes and hostility (integration)."A The first of these
objectives is reflected in the Fair Housing Act, which outlaws
discrimination by those who make properties available for rent or
purchase.48 The second goal is reflected in section 805 of the FHA,
which prohibits discrimination "in residential real estate-related
transactions . .. in making available such a transaction, or in the terms
or conditions of such a transaction."49 It also supplies an element of
empowerment, as does § 804(c), by quelling rhetorically harmful
speech in the marketplace.50 Finally, section 805 gives aggrieved
Housing Act at 40,41 IND. L. REv. 605, 605 (2008).
4 See Larkin, supra note 43, at 1623.
45 See id.
46 KERNER REPORT, supra note 43, at 263.
7 Larkin, supra note 43, at 1622 (citing KERNER REPORT, supra note 43, at 230). Larkin
also explains that, according to the Commission, integration initially would benefit black and
white middle class Americans more than others because the purpose of national legislation
would be to empower black Americans to move into white neighborhoods, rather than
encourage the opposite result. See id. at 1625. Whose interests the Fair Housing Act was meant
to advance in the short term is beyond the scope of this Note, but Larkin's explanations on how
the white middle class chooses not to integrate, see id at 1630-40, are supportive of a continuing
need to remove racist speech from discourse in as far-reaching a manner as is constitutionally
permitted.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
4 Id. § 3605(a).
5o Cf Larkin, supra note 43, at 1627 (explaining that "protecting private housing choice
was the direct result of the Act"); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair
Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity,
and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 69, 72 (1995) (arguing
that racist speech and decision making construct a community rhetoric that subverts the upward
498 [Vol. 60:2
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minority applicants a reasonable ground to challenge racial redlining
and other practices that prevent them from obtaining necessary
financing that is readily available to similarly situated non-minority
applicants. Taken together, these subsections work to further the
Commission's integration goal by eliminating practical barriers of
choice and limiting rhetorical injuries that may preempt the mobility
of housing-seeking minorities.
With those purposes in mind, Congress enacted Title VM of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,51 better known as the Fair Housing Act. The
Act establishes as civilly enforceable the right of persons in the
United States to buy or rent housing free of discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin." 52 The FHA's prohibition against outright refusals, denials, or
other actions that make housing unavailable on the basis of invidious
bias is limited, however, and does not apply to "single-family
house[s] sold or rented by an owner" without the use of a real estate
broker.5 3 "[R]ooms or units in dwellings containing ... no more than
four families," provided that the "owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence," also escape the
FHA's prohibitions.54 The exceptions to the statute's prohibitions
seem to have some basis in freedom of association, but in reality, the
so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemptions are products of legislative
compromise between liberals and moderates in Congress. 5
The Act's discriminatory statements provision is broader than the
plain refusals prohibition. Section 804(c) makes it unlawful to "make,
print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement . . . indicat[ing] any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention" to
express such a discriminatory motive.5 6 Unlike the denials prohibition
mobility of blacks in the U.S.).
s1 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3619 (2006)).
52 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (prohibiting refusals to "sell or rent ... or negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person" because that person
belongs to one of the protected categories).
s3 Id. § 3603(b)(1). The broker herself cannot engage in outright discrimination. See id §
3605(a) (prohibiting discrimination by those whose business includes "engaging in residential
real estate-related transactions").
- Id. § 3603(b)(2).
55 See Dubofsky, supra note 38, at 155-57 (discussing the Dirksen compromise, which led
to the creation of the Mrs. Murphy exception, and explaining that one of the major concerns of
the FHA's opponents was states' rights).
6 Id. § 3604(c).
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in Section 804(a), 804(c) is not limited by the "Mrs. Murphy"
exception,57 Further, the discriminatory advertising prohibition is
substantively more expansive than the plain refusal prohibitions
because of its application to discrimination on the basis of
"handicap."58  The sheer breadth of section 804(c)'s prohibition
suggests that the indignity injury engendered by discriminatory
language was important in congressional deliberation over the Fair
Housing Act. Also, there is some evidence that section 804(c) was
intended to further the substantive goal of integration in addition to
the elimination of discrimination.
Judicial interpretation of the statute in the standing area has further
highlighted the purposes of the Fair Housing Act, particularly with
regard to the limited scope of the discriminatory advertising
provisions. While courts have interpreted section 804(c) to clearly
prohibit the use of discriminatory advertisements to effect outright
denials and discrimination, an indignity injury alone may or may not
confer standing to address an FHA violation.6 An individual
unquestionably would have standing under the FHA if she were
offended by a discriminatory advertisement for housing that she
would have pursued but for the offensive advertisement.6 1 These
standing rules, though somewhat murky, suggest that courts interpret
Title VH's main concerns to be integration and antidiscrimination. In
many situations, however, the indignity injury itself is not given much
weight, and the ads are only actionable where they affect decisions in
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) ("Nothing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection
(c)) shall apply to [the listed exceptions]." (emphasis added)).
58 Id.
59 See Schwemm, supra note 36, at 213 (explaining that "congressional desire to promote
integrated living patterns through the FHA is an important basis for the proper interpretation of
§ 3604(c)").
60 Compare Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that a protected person had a viable claim based entirely upon viewing advertisements that may
have a discriminatory effect, despite the fact that the claimants were not actively seeking
housing), with Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Props., Inc., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that receipt of discriminatory ads results only in abstract injury unless the claimant is
actually deterred from seeking the advertised rental). Cf Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that testers who are steered away from certain housing on the basis of
race have standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), despite not having actual intent to rent the
space for themselves); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (holding
that non-protected individuals have standing to sue for integrative practices in their city on the
ground that plaintiffs had "lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community").
61 See, e.g., Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1986)
(explaining that under Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363, the individual plaintiff had standing
to sue on the basis that she "noticed and was deeply offended by the virtual absence of blacks in
the brochure, which indicated to her, quite understandably, that GSC did not wish to appeal to
blacks").
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the housing marketplace. 62 The courts' interpretation of the Act's
purposes is well founded, however limiting it might be.63
2. Effects and Problems
De facto housing segregation remains a major problem in the
United States, though some gains in neighborhood integration have
been recorded.64 The modest integration and slight decrease in
ghettoization witnessed since the FHA's passage cannot exclusively
be attributed to the Act. Many state and local governments and
agencies have instituted rules and regulations that further integration
and the eradication of blatant housing discrimination. 65 Most of those
state regulations were instituted in a post-FHA environment,
however.66 The local and state programs, like the Fair Housing Act,
also further the goal of educating the majority on what it means to be
segregated and to suffer discrimination, as well as the effects that
discrimination has on society generally.
One problem that fair housing efforts using the FHA continue to
face is the reliance on the adversarial process to effect change. The
62 E.g., Glenwood, 98 F.3d 590 (actual deterrence from seeking housing required to state a
claim under the FHA). It is true that Havens Realty Corp suggests that Congress intended
standing under the Fair Housing Act to be as broad as U.S. CONST. art. Il will allow. See 455
U.S. at 372-73. It is important to remember, however, that Article H1 standing is only broad
enough to embrace claims based on demonstrable, particularized injuries. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying third-party standing for plaintiffs in a 42 U.S. §§ 1981, 1982,
1983 action, explaining that the claimants had to be able to show that defendant's conduct
actually interfered with their pro-integrative housing choices). Thus, mere "offense" at the
discriminatory content of an advertisement will not confer standing unless a plaintiff can show
that, at a minimum, she is a member of the group against which the ad discriminates.
63 Underlying the analysis in Part III, infra, however, is a basic agreement with the
position that offensive statements alone should give standing to.an aggrieved minority
individual, notwithstanding that individual's lack of interest in acquiring the property. Cf
Richard Delgado, Words that Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words that
Wound] (arguing for creation of a tort action for racial insults, modeled after intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
6 See George C. Galster, The Evolving Challenges of Fair Housing Since 1968: Open
Housing, Integration, and the Reduction of Ghettoization, 4 CITYSCAPE 123, 128 (1999),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL4NUM3/galster.pdf (citing
data suggesting that integrated neighborhoods have lost their previous pariah status-
"[bjetween 1980 and 1990, 76.4 percent of the mixed [neighborhoods] remained so, whereas
only 61 percent remained so during the 1970s"). But see NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, DR.
KING'S DREAM DENIED: FORTY YEARS OF FAILED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 12-13 (2008),
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/reports/2008%2OFair%2OHousing
%20Trends%20Report.pdf (citing statistics showing that "segregation does seem to be declining
on some dimensions nationwide, (though] . . . very slowly, and . .. increasing in some areas").
6 See Galster, supra note 64, at 128 (explaining that "pro-integrative practices, such as
limits on for-sale signs, affirmative marketing, and financial incentives" have had some effect
on integration and that "the upsurge in such practices has been a major change in the fair
housing landscape since 1968").
6 See id.
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1988 Amendments67 strengthened the Act by providing new
administrative enforcement procedures and less onerous burdens on
complainants in private causes of action, but both of these depend on
the existence of specific instances of housing discrimination.68 The
specter of litigation has been shown to change behavior, of course,
but too heavy a reliance on actions commenced by private actors
inevitably slows change.69
Also frustrating the purpose underlying the FHA are two of the
substantive goals identified by Congress-antidiscrimination and
integration-because the intense focus on these objectives has limited
efforts to further the goal of empowerment. 70 Empowerment takes
tangible form in economic and educational opportunities and
intangible form in the psychological benefits of de-ghettoization. 7' By
focusing too much on segregation indices and stabilizing integration
patterns, fair housing regulation-at both federal and state levels-
has undercut efforts to improve actual equality of opportunity.72 Such
67 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
68 See Ware, supra note 42, at 80-82 (explaining that the 1988 Amendments empowered
administrative law judges to assess fines against violators and enhanced the effectiveness of
private causes of action by providing a longer statute of limitations, eliminating the need to
exhaust administrative remedies before a proceeding may begin in federal court, and increasing
the sources of monetary relief available such as attorneys' fees and punitive damages).
Obviously, the 1988 Amendments will only enhance the FHA's effectiveness insofar as they are
utilized, and they may only be used when a justiciable controversy (a specific instance of
discrimination) presents itself.
6 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REv.
339, 341-42 (2000) (explaining that rules of law change behavior because of individual
endeavors to "maximize satisfaction of his preferences, given his beliefs about how he can
accomplish these ends, subject to the constraints of his opportunities" and because of an
economic choice process) (emphasis added). Inherent in the attitudinal model is the economic
actor's awareness of limits on her choices, so litigation is only truly effective as a regulator
when cases are brought either directly against the economic actor or in her community. But cf
ANDREW P. MoRRiss, BRUCE YANDALE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LITIGATION
47 (2009) (explaining that use of litigation as a regulatory technique is comparable in
effectiveness to regulation by rulemaking and regulation by negotiation).
70 See Powell, supra note 43, at 617-18 (arguing that new regulation should focus on
empowerment through opportunity specifically "directed to affirmatively connect affordable
housing to neighborhoods of opportunity, whether they are in a revitalized inner city or in an
affluent suburb"); Larkin, supra note 43, at 1649-50 (citing KERNER REPORT, supra note 43, at
224) (arguing for empowerment and identifying one step as "ghetto enrichment"). But see
Christopher C. Ehrman, Integration Versus Antidiscrimination: Which Policy Should Prevail
When Applying the Fair Housing Act?, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 33, 55-58 (1993) (arguing that
integration is the FHA's greatest goal).
71 See Galster, supra note 64, at 131 & fig.1 (showing that behavioral adaptations along
"path A" result from "the spatial confinement of a poor, minority population in an area of
attenuated opportunity").
72 See id. at 128-29 (highlighting integration's meager successes and explaining
de-ghettoization's massive failures). This argument does assume, however, that there is a
limited pool of resources available for addressing fair housing concerns and that energetically
pursuing integration reduces the resources accessible for fair housing efforts.
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inequality leads to behavioral adaptations among minorities, which
reinforce racial prejudice, eventually buttressing individual choices to
segregate.7 3
The FHA's advertising provision furthers the substantive policy
goal of empowerment by eliminating just one form of rhetorical
violence against minorities. Professor Delgado has explained that, at
least in the race context, "[tjhe psychological harms caused by . . .
stigmatization are often much more severe than those created by other
stereotyping actions."74 Because of its effect of removing from the
housing marketplace objectionable and stigmatizing language, a
reasonably foreseeable-though maybe unexpected--outcome of
section 804(c) is that the FHA's statements prohibition will promote
community building. The advertising provision, as is the case with all
hate speech prohibitions, eradicates from the "master narrative" the
"story" of minority inferiority. Replacing noxious racist
advertisements with race-neutral ones both protects minority
individuals from the stigma and interferes with the perpetuation of
racial prejudice among the majority.76
The ever-increasing use of online advertising resources in the
housing market only exacerbates the FHA's enforcement challenges
and its corresponding ability to further these substantive goals.
Between the practical problems facing plaintiffs suing users78 and the
substantive problems with the merits of a claim against providers of
online services for FHA violations 79 and the Communications
73 See Galster, supra note 64, at 131 & fig. 1. Another serious problem affecting housing
efforts is the "resegregation" scenario. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1965, 1988-94 (2000) (discarding the inflexible
"tipping point" theory for other dynamic game-theory models of "resegregation," and arguing
that resegregation is a product of multiple economic factors that may be neutralized to avoid
ghettoization).
74 Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 63, at 136. Richard Delgado also notes that
"[t]he psychological responses to such stigmatization consist of feelings of humiliation,
isolation, and self-hatred. Consequently, it is neither unusual nor abnormal for stigmatized
individuals to feel ambivalent about their self-worth and identity." Id. at 137; see also id. at
136-43 (explaining "[tihe [h]arms of [r]acism").
7 See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling] ("The stories or
narratives told by the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to outgroups, and provide it
with a form of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen as natural.").
76 See Galster, supra note 64, at 131 fig.1. The advertising provision impedes both "path
B" and "path C" by obstructing racist speech, a reinforcement mechanism along both of those
pathways. Id.
n See infra Part II.
7 Cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
individual users in that case were at worst anonymous or at best non-recoverable).
7 See infra Part II (analyzing hurdles to stating a cause of action for a section 804(c)
violation in the "Craigslist context").
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Decency Act's immunization for the most powerful,80 perhaps section
804(c) cannot do its work. While it might seem overblown to declare
that the advertising provision will become a dead letter in the future,
it cannot be denied that while Craigslist's and Roommate's users "in
the past . .. might have placed an ad in local and college newspapers,
or hung a sign in a laundromat or coffee shop, today [they] would
surely go online."8 1 Thus, unless liability can be imposed on the
powerful defendants, only the (usually semi-anonymous) individual
users will be accountable for these advertisements, and meaningful
relief will be impossible.8 2
B. The Communications Decency Act-Enactment, Purposes, and
Provisions
On October 24 and 25 of 1994, a "poster" on Prodigy Services
Company's "Money Talk" bulletin board posted statements about
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities investment banking firm. The
statements alleged, among other unfavorable things, that the firm's
president "committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with
the initial public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd."83 Stratton
Oakmont and its president sued Prodigy and the unidentified user,
alleging that the ISP was liable in ten separate causes of action,
including one for defamation as the publisher of the user's posts. 84 A
0 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that a provider of forums for online classifieds was
immune from an FHA claim alleging discriminatory advertising because it was not an
"information content provider" under the CDA); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding
that a provider of housing forums was an "information content provider" under the CDA and
thus not immune from FHA claim).
9I Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, HousingDiscrimination.com?: The Ninth Circuit
(Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching
Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 331 (2008). Klein and Doskow conclude that "the
Ninth Circuit has correctly held that the [Communications Decency Act] does not relieve
housing websites from their obligation under the federal Fair Housing Act (and related state
civil rights laws) to refrain from facilitating and disseminating discriminatory advertisements."
Id. at 378-79.
82 Meaningful relief in this context does not only mean money damages, though that is a
significant concern for some plaintiffs. In the invasion of privacy context, for example, money
damages are necessary to compensate an individual for the injury caused by such an invasion.
See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 656-57 (finding that a multi-million dollar judgment would likely
never be recovered because GTE, the Internet services provider, was immune under the CDA,
and individual sellers were either anonymous or non-recoverable). Meaningful relief in the Fair
Housing context anticipates behavior modification of the big players, resulting in improved
policing of FHA-offensive content. Essentially, meaningful relief would mean a paradigm shift
from "hands-off" policing to "hands-on" policing by ISPs.
13 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
8 See id.
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huge hurdle in the case for the plaintiffs was establishing that Prodigy
was in fact the publisher of the statements, not just because it was
necessary to their claim, but also because of the novelty-at the
time-of suits against ISPs.8 1
The court in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
applied the common law doctrine of publisher liability,86 inquiring
whether the defendant exercised sufficient editorial control over the
content on its Web sites.87 The common law requires that the
publisher be more than a mere conduit of content, which is precisely
what Prodigy claimed to be.89 The court held for the plaintiffs on the
issue, explaining that Prodigy "held itself out to the public and its
members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards
[and] . . . implemented this control through its automatic software
screening program" and enforcement of its content guidelines.90 The
court's decision was the obvious result under the common law
doctrine, given that Prodigy claimed editorial control over its content
by openly proclaiming that it "pursuled] a value system that reflects
the culture of the millions of American families [they] aspire[d] to
serve." 9' It is the obvious result unless, as Judge Kozinski put it in a
different context, "conduct [that] is unlawful . . . face-to-face or by
telephone, magically become[s] lawful" because it is done online.92
While Judge Kozinski's position in Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C. seems utterly reasonable,
Congress disagreed with the Stratton result. Congress found that it
threatened other Internet policy goals, such as encouraging ISPs to
exercise some degree of control over the content disseminated by its
services but refraining from imposing affirmative obligations on them
to do so. Many members of Congress expressed alarm about the
prevalence of online pornography, objectionable "chat rooms," and
the ready accessibility to minors of such explicit material.9 3
85 See id. at *3.
8 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977)).
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (describing a publisher's liability for
defamation).
8 Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *3.
8 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (explaining that a
publisher exercises significant editorial control over the content it disseminates and is more than
a conduit or passive receptacle).
9 Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
9 Id. at *2.
9 Klein & Doskow, supra note 81, at 379 (alterations in original) (citing Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc)).
9 See 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden) ("We are all against
smut and pornography, and, as the parents of two small computer-literate children, my wife and
I have seen our kids find their way into these chat rooms that make their middle-aged parents
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The mid-1990s, it might be said, were characterized by fascination
about the Internet's possibilities and borderline irrational
apprehension about how access to obscene content might become
overly free.94 Running concurrent to Congress's desire to restrict
minors' access to pornography on the Internet was another stated goal
to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet . .. unfettered by Federal or State regulation."95
The fallout after Stratton in 1995, along with Congress's conflicting
goals, led to the passage of the Cox-Wyden Amendment,9 6 which
yielded section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.97
Following the result in Stratton, Congress believed that the only
prudent thing to do was to immunize ISPs and their users of publisher
liability, so that they might be incentivized to do something about the
offensive content that other users post.99 They thought it a
"backward" result that an ISP that made a sincere effort to clean its
Web sites of offensive content could be held liable as a publisher of
the content it failed to remove, while an ISP that made no effort to
remove offensive posts would get off scot-free.'" As a commonsense
matter, Congress might have been right. After all, the law should
encourage ISPs to do something about wanton displays of indecent
material, and it might seem illogical that an ISP that is not doing what
Congress would like comes out better than one that is attempting to
further Congress's wishes. But the Cox-Wyden Amendment falls
short of encouragement because it provides-at best-a carrot and no
cringe.").
9 See 141 CONG. REc. 17,083-89 (1995) (statements of Sens. Grassley & Exon and
supporting documents); Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberpom, TIME, July 3,
1995, at 38. The Communications Decency Act included another provision in addition to
problematic section 230 that arguably went to the heart of the congressional purpose in passing
the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994). Later held unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), section 223(d) criminalized any knowing sending or display of content that "in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs . . . ." Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(d)). For background on section 223 and analysis of the Court's reasoning in Reno, see
Steven D. Burt, Statute Note, Strict Scrutiny in Cyberspace: The Invalidation of the
Communications Decency Act and the Slow Demise of the Child Online Protection Act, 8 J.L.
FAM. STUD. 241 (2006).
- 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006).
96 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 137, 137-39 (1996) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2006)).
- 47 U.S.C. § 230.
98 No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
9 See 141 CONG. REc. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (explaining that his
amendment protects ISPs from liability in return for helping solve the obscenity problem).
0 See id.
506 [Vol. 60:2
THE INTERNET IS FOR DISCRIMINATION
stick. o It does not, though one commentator has suggested
otherwise, imply any good faith requirement.
Section 230(a) of the CDA explains in broad terms Congress's
perceptions of the Internet's development. 0 3 In subsection (b), the
Act delineates Congress's aspirations in passing the CDA, which
include: promoting the "continued development of the Internet,"
preserving the "vibrant and competitive free market" that exists on
the Internet, and, most importantly here, "remov[ing] disincentives
for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies." 10 Curiously, Congress also purports to empower
"parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material" by removing the disincentives to
service providers to create new filtering technologies.'05 All told,
while the statute"'6 has had a huge impact on limiting ISP
responsibility, it has actually had little discernible effect on
encouraging ISPs to create filters.
The most problematic section of the CDA for purposes of this
Note, however, is section 230(c). It provides first that "[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."0 7 It then precludes civil liability on
account of blocking or removing offensive material or any policies
that enable others to remove or block such material.108 The Act puts
ISPs in precisely the position that Congress intended. Without the
Act, if an ISP did not create the offensive material, the only
1o Actually, it likely provides neither a carrot nor a stick. It removes a disincentive for
ISPs to create filtering mechanisms, but it does not incentivize them either with some legal
benefit or via the specter of litigation or regulation.
10 See Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free
Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. the Communications Decency Act, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805, 835 (2007) (arguing that the conflict between the FHA and the
CDA can be read out by reading into the CDA a good faith requirement for immunity). Kurth's
suggestion finds some support in the Act's legislative history and text, but to reach her
suggested result, courts would have to read the good faith requirement into the statute, not
merely find it in the text.
03 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2006) (finding that there existed "a rapidly developing array of
Internet and other interactive computer services," that users exercise "a great degree of control
over the information" available, that the Internet "offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of
political discourse," that the "Internet ... flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a
minimum of government regulation," and that Americans were "[i]ncreasingly . . . relying" on
online services for "political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services").
1-47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(l)-(2), (b)(4).
I- Id. § 230(b)(4).
10 6 See id. § 230(c). Craigslist's flagging system, described infra in notes 143-47 and the
accompanying text, may be one example of the CDA's incentivizing purpose at work.
107 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
'
0 Id. § 230(c)(2).
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alternative for liability is as a publisher or, perhaps, a distributor.1 09
With the CDA, ISPs can meddle in the activities of their users without
fear of publisher liability. They can also stand back and let the
"unfettered" free market prevail, and likewise face no liability as a
publisher or on any other basis.
Congress's failure to include any sort of stick in section 230 is no
doubt the result of the goal of encouraging unfettered development of
the Internet. It was also the result of an assumption that "parents and
families [and ISPs] are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace
and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats."1 0 The
biggest logical flaw in the theory behind the Cox-Wyden Amendment
is its reliance on the good faith efforts of ISPs. It assumes that all ISPs
are like Prodigy and "pursu[e] a value system that reflects the culture
of . .. American families . . . ."111 Contrary to that assumption, it is
more likely that ISPs operate their Internet businesses entirely for
profit and have little interest in policing the content of their users'
posts. Moreover, the Cox-Wyden Amendment's specific preclusion of
publisher liability1 2 may actually disincentivize ISPs from exercising
editorial control over their sites because, no matter what they do, they
are not liable as publishers for user-generated content.
C. The FHA-CDA Conflict
The FHA aims to eliminate discrimination as exhaustively as
constitutionally permissible,1 13 and the advertising provision furthers
that goal in two separate ways. First, section 804(c) provides a
general prophylaxis to quell the use of discriminatory speech, and
thus combats the indignity injury suffered by those who in fact see
advertisements that discriminate against them.1 14 Second, it prevents
'See Grace v. eBay, Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the CDA
precluded publisher liability, but finding that eBay could be liable as a distributor of allegedly
defamatory statements posted by an eBay user).
110 41 CONG. REc. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
M' Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
I1
2 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) ("It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." (emphasis added)).
The advertising provision, for example, does not infringe upon the First Amendment because it
regulates purely commercial speech where the underlying transaction-discrimination in
housing-would be illegal and the actual message is misleading and/or has a negative effect on
the housing market. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972) (explaining
that section 804(c) does not hinder the "freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion" that the First Amendment is meant to protect (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (making it unlawful to "make, print, or publish" discriminatory
statements or advertisements related to the sale or rental of a dwelling).
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the use of public forums, newspapers, and other means of making,
printing, or publishing notices, statements, or advertisements to
further illegal activities.' Without the advertising provision, one
might argue, the right embodied in section 804(a) would be a dead
letter. While section 804(a) would prevent landlords, realtors, and
others from affirmatively denying or making housing unavailable to
customers or prospective tenants on the basis of membership in a
protected category,116 they could place advertisements in their local
newspapers declaring "NO MINORITIES" and effectively paralyze
protected individuals from applying to them in the first place. The
advertising provision thereby furthers Congress's goal of creating
"integrated and balanced communities,"1 l7 with the welcome side
effect of deterring and quelling discriminatory speech in public
forums, as well as in tangible advertisements and notices.
Given the incredible development of the Internet, which the CDA
has in no small part furthered, without some resolution of the conflict
between immunity under the CDA and the logical application of the
FHA's advertising provision, section 804(c) may eventually be all but
lost. Moreover, given that the advertising provision is the most
far-reaching and widely applicable of the Fair Housing Act's
provisions, the CDA may have a palpable effect on limiting the
continuing expansion of integrated housing opportunities. This result
is unfortunate, especially given the importance that fair housing
practices play today in both state and federal law.118
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in Chicago Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.119 and others
similarly situated, the evident conflict between the statutes does not
present a tough statutory construction issue. Given the high hopes
Congress vested in the FHA and its understanding of the facts at the
u
5 See id. (making it unlawful to "cause to be made, printed, or published" any
discriminatory statements or advertisements regarding housing).
"
6 See id. § 3604(a).
117 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
118 Nearly every state has enacted its own fair housing statute. Some of the statutes are
almost entirely coextensive with the Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603
(1974 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting discrimination against essentially the same classes as listed in
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(c)). Other states have identified their own names for the protected
categories, but closely resemble the FHA. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (2008)
(age, sex, race, color, marital status, physical or mental disability, religion, and national origin).
Another set of states protects a list of categories more limited than the federal Act. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204 (2006) (protecting essentially the same categories as the FHA,
but not including "handicap" as a protected group). Finally, some states have more expansive
protections than the FHA. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12955 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008)
(protecting all of the same categories as the FHA, but also protecting against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, source of income, and age).
"519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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time it passed the CDA,120 it might seem that Congress could not have
intended to obviate the FHA completely by enacting the CDA. It is,
however, "always appropriate to assume that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law,"l21  and so the
effects of a newer statute upon an older one bear a heavy presumption
of validity. While wholesale repeals by implication are rightly
disfavored, 12 2 where two statutes bear on a subject or case, to the
extent that the two cannot be reconciled, the old gives way to the
new. 123 Of course, one may argue that, because the FHA was never
mentioned in the CDA's legislative history, the fair advertising
provision should not be muted out. 124
At least one commentator has suggested that the conflict between
the FHA and the CDA can be read out of the latter by understanding
the CDA as an invitation for ISPs to protect users from actionable
conduct, rather than a provision of sweeping, intractable immunity. 12 5
The argument goes that the CDA actually provides immunity for
affirmatively removing content, rather than for failing to take any
action at all, 126 despite contrary judicial construction of the statute. 12 7
That is certainly a reasonable position, given that the CDA uses the
words "protection for blocking and screening" seven times in the
"rather brief § 230.",128 In addition, the legislative history of the CDA
suggests that Congress may have intended such a result.129 But, as is
120 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (a)(3) (2006) (recognizing the "rapidly developing array of
Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans" offering "a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity").
12 1 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979).
122 See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("It is a cardinal principle of
construction that repeals by implication are not favored.").123 See id. at 198-99 (explaining that there must be a "positive repugnancy between the
provisions of the new law and those of the old" and that the new law repeals the old only insofar
as is necessary to give the new one effect).
124 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (rejecting a construction of
amendments to the Voting Rights Act that would impliedly exclude vote dilution claims
involving judicial elections from the statute's coverage, since "if Congress had such an intent [to
exclude those claims] . . . at least some of the Members would have identified or mentioned it at
some point in the .. .extensive legislative history").
12 See Kurth, supra note 102, at 835 (arguing that "limiting the interpretation of the CDA
to immunizing only those host Web sites that make a good faith" effort to screen offensive
material would eliminate the apparent conflict between the CDA and the FHA).
12 6 Id. at 827.
127 See id. (citing cases and noting that courts have expanded the CDA's protection to those
who make no good faith efforts).
12 8 Id. at 835 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)).
129 See 141 CONG. REc. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (indicating that among the
purposes of the CDA's drafters was to explicitly overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Serv. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), and explaining that
it was illogical and bad policy if ISPs would "face higher, stric[t]er liability ... [if they] tried to
exercise some control over offensive material" than if they did nothing about it).
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always the case, the legislative history can easily be manipulated to
support much broader immunity.' 30
A stronger position is that the CDA's immunity provision is
merely definitional. The argument goes that section 230(c)(1), which
directs that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider,"l 3 1 specifically
defines ISPs as something other than publishers. Under the
definitional theory, the CDA thus exempts ISPs from liability in
actions requiring that they publish material. Under a definitional
theory of the statute, the CDA precludes enforcement of the FHA's
advertising provision against ISPs because that provision is legally
inapplicable to them.132 The text of the CDA does support this
somewhat limited interpretation of the statute, and the Seventh Circuit
adopted it in Craigslist.133 While the definitional interpretation
delimits the immunity provided by the CDA, it does nothing to save
FHA claims lodged against ISPs. In fact, it precludes relief.
Beyond the legal arguments and distinctions, the CDA and the
FHA seem to butt heads at a more fundamental level. The FHA's
advertising provision seeks to condemn use of the media to further
discrimination in housing and thereby eliminate illegal speech from
the marketplace.134 The CDA, by contrast, specifically precludes
actions against ISPs on any reasonable theory of liability under the
FHA, except insofar as the user or provider on its own becomes an
"information content provider."135 So while the FHA's advertising
provision places a very slight burden on the marketplace to the benefit
of a set of protected groups, the CDA limits ISP responsibility in
order to attain whatever the unfettered free market might allow.
3 See id.
13147 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
132 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 2d 681, 696-98 (N.D. 111. 2006) (holding that because the CDA specifically defines
ISPs as not "publisher[s] or speaker[s]" under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), the action brought under
the FHA for "publish[ing] . . . or caus[ing] . . . to be published," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), a
discriminatory advertisement was meritless as presented against Craigslist, an ISP), afd, 519
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
133 519 F.3d at 671.
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
'
35 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that section 230 "immunizes providers of interactive services
against liability arising from content created by third parties" though "[this grant of immunity
applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an 'information content
provider' (footnote omitted)). For commentary disclaiming the validity of the definitional
reading of § 230(c)(1), see Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency
Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 163, 174-78 (2006) (rebutting the "definitional"
reading of section 230(c)(1)).
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At the very least, it is reasonable to believe that Congress did not
affirmatively desire that the CDA would eviscerate the FHA's
advertising provision. In fact, it is likely that "Congress did not even
remotely contemplate discriminatory housing advertisements when it
passed § 230,"136 leaving to be determined only whether, from a
policy standpoint, the state of the law should remain as it currently
stands. In a broad sense, Congress has already made a statement about
what the state of the law ought to be, given that it has enacted a new
statute that conflicts with one previously passed. But it's incredible
that Congress would accept the fact that its substantive policy
ambitions may be thwarted in the digital age because of immunity
they provided without ever considering its effects on the FHA.
II. THE MERITS OF AND THEORETICAL ISSuES FACING A § 804(c)
CLAIM AGAINST CRAIGSLIST-LIKE WEB HOSTS
Assume the following: A Craigslist user posts an advertisement in
the apartments/housing forum for the rental of a duplex in a
residential area. After describing the premises and stating the rent
price, the last line of the ad explains that the landlord requires the
tenant(s) to be "quiet, respectful non-smokers who have no children
and who speak English fluently." The landlord does not live in the
duplex, and owns several other rental properties on the same block.
Doris Chang, a recently immigrated Chinese graduate student in
chemistry at a nearby university, searches through the Craigslist
housing forums for her area and comes across the ad at issue. The
advertisement distresses Chang, who thought the location and price
were ideal for her, her husband-also a newly immigrated Chinese
graduate student-and their one-year old daughter. She knows that
she and her husband do not speak English especially well, and she
believes that the landlord will likely reject them on that basis, though
they are quiet, respectful non-smokers.
Disregarding for now the CDA problem she faces,13 7 MS. Chang's
distress might give rise to claims under section 804(c) against the
landlord and Craigslist. Because the advertisement expresses
discriminatory intent on the basis of "familial status" (no children)
and "national origin" (tenants must speak English fluently), the
content of the advertisement violates the FHA.138 Applying the
136 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1
37 See supra Part LC (explaining the immunity provided under the CDA and its conflict
with the FHA's advertising provision).
138 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOus. AND URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE REGARDING
ADVERTISEMENTS UNDER § 804(c) OF THE FAIR HOUSING AcT 3-4 (1995), at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/disabilities/sect804achtenberg.pdf (explaining construction of
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language of section 804(c) to the landlord, there is no question that he
can be held liable under the section. The landlord clearly has made a
"notice, statement, or advertisement" that "indicates . .. preference[s
or] limitation[s]" on the bases of "familial status, or national
origin."l 3 9 Applying section 804(c) to Craigslist, however, presents
difficult construction questions in two different theories of liability.
Chang might say that Craigslist published the advertisement. The
big hurdle for her, obviously, will be the same one presented to the
plaintiffs in Stratton.'4 To establish that Craigslist is subject to
publisher liability, Chang would have to show that Craigslist
exercised some degree of editorial control over the content of the
advertisement.141 Unlike ads printed in traditional media like
newspapers or magazines, which are pored over by editorial staff
before printing/publishing, Craigslist ads appear approximately
fifteen minutes after the user enters the information.14 2  The
advertisements are policed using a user-generated editing system,
whereby Craigslist's viewers may "flag" ads that they believe are
miscategorized, prohibited, "spam," or something that falls within the
"best of Craigslist."l 4 3 Presumably, some employee at Craigslist then
reviews the flagged material and determines whether it must be
removed.'" Craigslist also warns its users that "stating a
discriminatory preference in a housing post is illegal," 4 5 and links its
users to a page 4 6 explaining that most states and the federal
government prohibit discrimination in housing advertisements, and
that Craigslist, itself, prohibits such discrimination.14 7 It might be
"race, color, or national origin," and "familial status").
13942 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
140See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at
*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (analyzing that "hurdle").
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 577 (1977) (requiring either intentional or
negligent conduct to establish publisher liability).
14 2 See Craigslist, About > Help > How, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/how (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010).
143 To view the available options, see Cleveland Craigslist, Apartments/Housing for Rent
Classifieds, http://cleveland.craigslist.orglapa/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2010), and click on any ad
and the options will appear at the top right corner of the screen.
144 The Craigslist "Help" pages, see supra note 142, do not explain what happens after a
post has been flagged. The author flagged an arguably discriminating ad and it did not
immediately disappear. If "flagging" does anything, it likely brings posts to the attention of
Craigslist employees.
145 Cleveland Craigslist Apartments and Housing for Rent Classifieds, http://cleveland
.craigslist.org/apal (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
146See id. (follow "stating a discriminatory preference in a housing post is illegal"
hyperlink).
14
7 See Craigslist, About > FHA, http://www.craigslist.orglabout/FHA (last visited Feb. 13,
2010).
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reasonable to argue that Craigslist holds itself out as a publisher in the
same way that Prodigy Services did in Stratton1 4 8 because Craigslist
both takes on the responsibility for removing FHA-offensive content
and prohibits, through its own policies, the expression of
discriminatory intent. Any user familiar with Craigslist, however,
would not think that the site holds itself out in that way, because the
impetus for any changes in the content of its ads is always
user-generated.149 Craigslist is more likely liable as a distributor than
as a publisher,'50 and that theory of liability is presently unavailable
under the FHA. 151
Alternatively, Chang might advance the theory that, under section
804(c), Craigslist would be liable for "caus[ing] to be made . . . or
published" the discriminatory advertisement. 152 Craigslist, however,
does not "cause" the ads to be made or published, except in a but-for
sense, because Craigslist is less like a newspaper and more like the
owner of a bulletin board. Section 804(c) is probably best read to
apply the causation requirement to the discriminating intent with
respect to entities that either are, or resemble, publishers, rather than
apply the causation requirement to the mere existence of the ad. Thus,
it is not enough that the entity causing the publication of the ad is a
mere conduit of the text; rather some causal relationship with the
discriminatory text is required. If no causal connection to the
discriminatory intent is required, then a mere conduit might be liable,
and Congress likely would have used some less particular term.
Because Craigslist likely has no causal connection to the
discriminatory intent expressed in the landlord's advertisement, it also
seems unlikely that Craigslist could be held liable under the "cause to
be . .. published" theory.153
Even if Congress eliminates the CDA immunity problem by
amending the CDA to make publisher liability theoretically available,
the practical requirements for FHA liability likely allow an entity like
Craigslist to get off scot-free for any failure to address a
discriminatory ad on its Web site. Even the Roommates. com case is of
1s See No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
14 9 It seems, however, that even if the viewer would not expect Craigslist to address the
problem, he or she would still likely be deterred from contacting the individual who posted the
advertisement to inquire about the property.
150oSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581 (1977) (explaining distributor liability).
'1 Distribution is not included among the prohibited actions listed in the FHA. See 42
U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
152 Id.
'3Id.; see also Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (analogizing Craigslist's ability to cause its users to
make discriminatory posts to money-savers' ability to cause bank robberies).
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no help to someone like Chang because the Ninth Circuit's decision
merely found that the ISP at issue did exercise editorial control over
the content of its ads and, based on that control, an FHA "publisher"
claim is viable.'5 Therefore, unless Congress affirmatively makes the
policy decision that the Fair Housing Act's advertising provision
should not apply to ISPs at all, it should address the problem by
amending the FHA. The following section explains one possible
theory for amending the Act that particularly bears in mind the
advertising provision's importance in quelling the use of harmful
speech in the housing marketplace.
III. RECOGNIZING THE INTERNET'S ROLE AS A
COMMUNITY-BUILDING TOOL
All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in
their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological,
moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no
part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is
the massage.
Discourse addressing the political, legal, and popular possibilities
that the Internet provides generally falls into two camps. The first
touts the Internet as the greatest technological advancement since the
printing press because it will make a true "participatory democracy
possible" and "the Internet and its various platforms are inherently
democratic."l 5 6 The second flouts the first's utopian view and instead
focuses on dystopian "fears of cyberstalking and pornography."157 Of
course, neither position gets it entirely correct. Each fails to consider
the possibility that the Internet can be both "democracy" and
"pornography," and yet also neither of them. The central difficulty is
that the pervasiveness of all communication technologies and their
multi-faceted effects limit the clarity of any definition we might
ascribe to such technologies.15 8
'5 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d
1157, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
1ss MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 26 (1996).
56 Collin Gifford Brooke, Cybercommunities and McLuhan: A Retrospect, in RHETORIC,
THE PoLIs, AND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 24 (C. Jan Swearingen, ed., 1999).
157 Id.
158 See MCLUHAN & FIORE, supra note 155, at 74-75 (explaining that society has a
tendency to look at present technologies "through a rear-view mirror"-attempting to categorize
new technologies with old and glossing them with the predilections of the past, rather than
identifying what new liberties and possibilities the technology offers). There is also the
"unexceptionalist" view among legal scholars, which argues that the Internet is not so incredibly
different from anything we have seen before that it defies regulation. See, e.g., Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CH. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (arguing that cyberspace
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It is important to recognize that interactive computer services,
Web sites, and other forms of online communities's9 comprise a
means of communication, a communal, non-physical space, and a
channel of commerce.' As Internet communication and commerce
gained prominence and importance during the 1990s, lawmakers
began to address the issue, hoping to assuage society's concerns about
its development. By way of example, the Clinton-Gore
administration's conception of the infamous "information
superhighway," a clever metaphor nearly synonymous with
"Internet," was one important mode of quelling fears and furthering
the conception of the Internet as the most powerful invention for
promoting commerce and democracy since the telegraph. 16 1
A. Communication, Rhetoric, and Discourse
Whatever the merits of the superhighway metaphor, the present
analysis focuses on the Internet's role as a medium of communication
and, within that role, the work it does-along with all other
communication technologies-to build and maintain communities
and narratives. 162 Among discourse theorists, "[t]here is a strong sense
... [that] the real is characterised [sic] as a set of constructs formed
transactions are not any less resistant than traditional transactions to governmental regulation
and that regulation is feasible and legitimate). For an at length rebuke to the unexceptionalist
view, see David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 883 (2008) (tracing the Internet's development and discussing possibilities for its
regulation using THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1794) as a
metaphorical guide).
'19E.g., Craigslist, About > Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010) (self-titling itself an "Online Community"); Welcome to Facebook!,
http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (claiming to help "you connect and share
with the people in your life").
16 See generally Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and
the Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541 (1998) (analyzing the
metaphor that the Internet is the "information superhighway"); Harmeet Sawhney, Information
Superhighway: Metaphors as Midwives, 18 MEDIA CULTURE & Soc'y 291 (1996) (discussing
how the metaphor, "information superhighway" is a tool for understanding change in
technology and emerging technologies, the influence of such metaphors, and the implications of
the use of metaphors in the case of the National Information Infrastructure).
161 See Calvert, supra note 160, at 543 (arguing that "the information superhighway
metaphor is a strategically chosen rhetorical device employed ... to frame debate about Internet
and telecommunications regulation, to implicitly suggest that particular legal choices are more
viable-and valid-than others").
'
62 For a broad explanation of community-building and community maintenance through
community rhetoric, see J. Michael Hogan, Rhetoric and the Restoration of Community, in
RHETORIC AND COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN UNITY AND FRAGMENTATION 292-301 (J. Michael
Hogan ed., 1998); see also Calvert, supra note 160, at 557 (explaining that communication is a
"symbolic social process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed").
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through discourse."l6 3 This conception has varied applications, though
it is summarized well by the phrase the "ritual view of
communication. "'" Under the ritual view, communications regulation
focuses on "the preservation and maintenance of extant
communities."1 65 "Preservation" is used somewhat neutrally in this
context-discursive structures confirm for us what the world is, so
they often reinforce prejudices, misunderstandings and inequalities of
opportunity in addition to other more benign group perspectives.
Turning to the Fair Housing Act's advertising provision,16 7 while
the framers of the provision likely were not influenced directly by
discourse analysis or critical race theory, removing from the
marketplace language that would deter minority individuals from
seeking housing that they would otherwise have sought deconstructs
one discursive barrier to the free choice of those individuals. It also
prohibits one subset of hate speech, thereby preventing the wound
caused by the racial slur.16 8 Removing racial slurs from advertising
disassembles the racial community established by such slurs. 69
Moreover, advertising itself is arguably the "largest, most pervasive,
and most successful rhetorical enterprise on the planet. . . .""o While
much of the power of advertising derives from the powerful
individuals and corporations that place advertisements in the
marketplace, it is also "the type of speech most likely to be witnessed
by the hoi polloi" regardless of the power of its creator.'7 1 If section
163 SARA MILLS, DISCOURSE 45 (2d ed. 2004) (1997).
164 Calvert, supra note 160, at 557 (quoting JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS
CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA AND SOCIETY 18 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
transmission model stands in contrast to the ritual model. See id. at 558 (explaining that the
transmission model focuses on "speed, efficiency, and control," while the ritual model focuses
on "common roots").
165 Id. at 559.
'
66 See MILLS, supra note 163, at 128 (discussing conversational analysis and social
psychology, explaining that "racist discourse [has] ... outcomes in the real world in that it has
the effect of categorising [sic] and discriminating between certain groups, and it legitimises [sic]
the practices [keeping the dominant groups] . . . in their positions of power"); cf Delgado,
Storytelling, supra note 75, at 2412 (explaining that the use of stories and narrative by the
majority-or the privileged-reinforces its position of authority and strength). The concept of
the "master" or "grand narrative" derives from this concept as well, and some theorists argue
that use of racist language engenders a master narrative of minority inferiority. See, e.g.,
Robinson, Master Narrative, supra note 50, at 72 ("The master narrative of black inferiority
means the absolutely dominant or privileged story that defines how blacks win or lose, succeed
or fail.").
167 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
'
6 8 See Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 63, at 143-49 (discussing the "[h]arms of
[r]acial [i]nsults").
6 Cf Delgado, Storytelling, supra note 75, at 2412 (discussing the way in which stories
define and distinguish "outgroups" from the dominant group in society).
170 Stephen McKenna, Advertising as Epideictic Rhetoric, in RHETORIC, THE POLIS, AND
THE GLOBAL VILLAGE, supra note 156, at 103.
"1 Id. at 105; see also id. (explaining that advertising is "corporate," "multiply mediated,"
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804(c) ceases to be applicable to advertising, as it might effectively
become if online ads cannot be touched,172 then one of the most
formidable rhetorical enterprises may be rife with speech that can
perpetuate intolerance, misunderstanding, and inequality of
opportunity.
B. Community-Maintenance Online: A Case Study
One concern about applying traditional community-building
theories to Internet communication might be that, because the Internet
provides such an incredible diversity of points of view, the usual rules
do not apply.173 Indeed, one might argue that, because Internet
communication is so decentralized, it will have a greater effect on
deconstructing traditional notions and community thinking, rather
than on reinforcing it. But norm-reinforcing discourse and rhetoric
occurs in regional, national, and international scopes.
This subsection addresses one specific anecdote of a community
using the Internet's power to shame one of its local residents and
reinforce its society's norms. Although this anecdote does not directly
apply the discursive analyses thus far referenced in this Part,174 it does
highlight the idea that the Internet is communication, rather than an
international system of interlocking pieces connecting every person in
the world regardless of his or her desire to be connected.17 Further, it
refutes-at least rhetorically-the notion that the Internet is entirely
cyberspace, rather than yet another iteration of mass communication
technology.' 76
and that its audience is "massive and heterogeneous").
172 See Frank Ahrens, Debt-Saddled Tribune Co. Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at DI (explaining that "the rise of the Internet and other options for news,
information and reader time have sent readers and advertisers away from newspapers in the past
half-decade, crippling them"); see also David Swensen & Michael Schmidt, Op-Ed., News You
Can Endow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A31 (explaining that newspapers are quickly moving
toward obsolescence in the age of free news available on the Web).
73 Cf Post, supra note 158, at 912-13 (discussing the possibility that virtual communities
should be "self-governing" and ultimately arguing that old liability rules should not be
presumed to apply in virtual worlds). Of course, the proposition that virtual communities are
self-governing does not necessarily undermine the proposition that community-building theories
ought to apply to them.
174 Indeed, the anecdote relates a use of the Internet to directly enforce norms, rather than
the use of communication to reinforce stigmas and stereotypes at a meta-dialogic level. Still, the
anecdote illustrates a use of the Internet as a means of communication for reinforcing local
norms and expressing dissatisfaction with the actions of members of the community.
1 Users' choices about what points they want to connect to will likely be guided by what
is relevant to them. For example, individual consumers are likely to read blogs that address a
topic area that interests them or peruse the news and forums relevant to their geographic area,
rather than blogs or forums that are irrelevant to their lives outside of cyberspace.
176 "The Internet" is concrete, while "Cyberspace" is rhetorical. "The Internet" means,
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In the summer of 2005, a South Korean woman's dog decided,
while they were on the subway, "that [the subway] was a good place
to do its business." 77 The woman failed to pick it up or to do
anything else about the dog's business. Some onlookers jeered her for
not addressing the problem, and she "grew belligerent in response."178
Someone on the train photographed the incident using a camera
phone and posted the pictures to a popular Web site. "Net dwellers
soon began to call her by the unflattering nickname," Dog Poop Girl,
and a "call to arms for . .. information about her" ensued. 17 9 Within
days, the call produced data revealing the woman's identity and past,
and people began to recognize her on the street.180 Disgraced,
"discussed in Sunday sermons in Korean churches in the Washington
area," and forever bearing the unfortunate nickname Dog Poop Girl,
the woman "reportedly quit her university."181
The South Korean woman's saga of public humiliation and
ridicule teaches important lessons about the shaming power of
Internet forums, but it also teaches that communities will use the
Internet's tools to reinforce their norms just as other traditional media
have been used. Of course, curbing one's canine is likely a norm in
many places. The use of this anecdote does not mean to suggest that
South Korean society has a particular penchant for dog curbing or that
the forums that individuals used to track down information about Dog
Poop Girl are particularly well suited to their interests. Rather, it
suggests that the Internet's power has been used to do similar work to
what discursive structures accomplish, and it furthers the theory that
the Internet will be used to deal with the same problems that print and
other more traditional media have been utilized to address.
IV. A CALL FOR THE REVISION OF § 804(c)
Recognizing the Internet's role as a communication tool that does
the same community-building work as other forms of communication,
and acknowledging the FHA advertising provision's contribution to
the deconstruction of discursive barriers, Congress must amend
essentially, infrastructure, and the term "Cyberspace" is used to explain the complex set of
communities created through online interaction. See Michael J. Madison, The Narratives of
Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 249-51 (2004)
(briefly explaining this distinction).
"n Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet's Power to Shame,
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section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act to resolve the conflict between
it and the Communications Decency Act and ensure that the fair
advertising provision can do its work online. This Section provides
additional background on the debates in cyberspace law and suggests
the contours of the proposed amendment.
A. Looking to Theories of Cyberspace Law'8 2
To best ameliorate the conflict between the FHA and the CDA,
Congress must bear in mind some of the medium-specific concerns
about regulation of individuals and corporations on the Internet. In
general, Congress has shied away from governing cyberspace, though
it has been motivated to do so in some situations, either by pressing
public concern or in reaction to troubling court decisions. 18 3 Indeed,
Congress enacted the CDA in response to both popular concern about
cyber pornography and the decision in the Stratton case.18
Scholarship on cyberspace law does not evenly divide into
separate camps, though how the legal options are formulated often
depends on the "host of mostly physicalized constructs" that theorists
use to explain cyberspace.185  After conceptualizing cyberspace,
commentators then approach it as either a polemic upon which
traditional conceptions of law should be forced or for which those
rules should be tailored to fit,18 6 or by attempting to establish some
semi-universal truth-or waiting for the truth to establish itself-
about what rules ought to apply.' 8 7 These approaches are typical when
scholars attempt to deal with developments in technology.' 88
182 For an entertaining read that provides exceptional background on the developments in,
and debates surrounding, cyberspace law, see Madison, supra note 176.
183 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997) (provision of the CDA enacted in response to
pressing public concern about "cyberporn"), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (responding to court decisions interfering with Congress's
conception of cyberspace).
184See 141 CONG. REc. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (explaining that his
amendment protects ISPs from liability and rejects the Stratton court's "backward" result of
holding a Web site accountable for its content where it actually monitors the activity of its
users) (discussing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL
323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)).
185 Madison, supra note 176, at 250. See also generally Calvert, supra note 160 (arguing
that the "information superhighway" metaphor framed the legal options available for governing
the Internet-at least during the Clinton-Gore administration).
186See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An
Application to Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2007) (proposing a general set of torts for
cyberspace).
181See, e.g., Post, supra note 158, at 913 (arguing that the laws applicable to
"cybercommunities" ought to be determined by the members of those communities, rather than
by Congress or other paternalistic bodies).
188 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 239, 242-43 (explaining that "many
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Specifically with respect to liability for torts and similar injuries
perpetrated in cyberspace-a category in which section 804(c)
violations likely fall-the focus has been on three legal problems
presented by technological advances: first, "the potential need for
laws to ban, restrict, or, alternatively, encourage a new technology";
second, "the possible over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness of
existing legal rules as applied to new practices"; and third, "alleged
obsolescence of existing legal rules." 89 The imposition of liability for
various "cyber-wrongs" will continue to perplex lawmakers well into
the future.190
B. Amending the FHA to Include Publisher and Distributor Liability
Against ISPs
As Part H explained, even if FHA plaintiffs could get beyond the
immunity hurdle that the CDA presents, they would still face a steep
uphill battle to convince a court that any of the six bases of FHA
liability apply to Craigslist-like corporations. 191 Craigslist-like
defendants are likely only liable under a distributor theory and, even
then, only to the extent that they fail to fulfill the duties imposed upon
them as distributors. Furthermore, advertising on the Internet-like
other forms of communication-reinforces norms and does some
work constructing a collective reality by employing discursive
legal problems arise in the context of technological change" and identifying four kinds of legal
problems that advances in technology tend to present).
'" Id. at 243. The Supreme Court, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2005), addressed the problem of applying traditional liability rules
for distribution of copyrighted material to decentralized organizations upon which traditional
liability theories were difficult to impose, but whose effects on the infringed materials could not
be readily overstated. The Court's opinion, taken as a whole, reflects a concern about the issue
of over- or under-inclusiveness in rulemaking.
'"The copying of copyrighted digital material, for example, was recently addressed by
Congress via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (2006)). For a general
overview of the DMCA's provisions and its problematic application to the protection of
software code, see Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP's Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for
Software Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 235-40 (2006). For some other interesting
questions dealing with cyber-wrongs, see Ashleigh Bergeron, Case Note, Butler v. Adoption
Media, LLC: Eradicating Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Cyberspace, 17 L. &
SExUALYTY REv. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 173, 176-77
(2008) (addressing a choice of law problem as applied to a Web-based adoption services
provider that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation); Michael 0. Finnigan, Jr., et al.,
Comment, Accommodating Cyberspace: Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to
the Internet, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795 (2007) (addressing a problem of judicial interpretation of
"reasonable accommodation" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12116, as it applied to an airline's Web site and its accommodations for the blind).
191 See supra Part H.
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structures. 19 2 Bearing these ideas in mind, Congress should amend the
Fair Housing Act to include publisher and distributor liability for
publishing or distributing discriminatory advertisements online.
Explicitly providing liability for distribution and publication online
would not only resolve the conflict between the FHA and CDA, but
would also provide a firm basis for stating FHA claims against
Craigslist-like "cyber bulletin boards" that do exercise some control
over the content displayed on their sites.
Providing for ISP distributor liability directly within section 804(c)
would clearly establish the contours of that liability for fair housing
violations.193 Also, distributor liability represents a balanced approach
to the problem. Legally defining ISPs as publishers, even in this
limited context, actually imposes burdens upon ISPs beyond what a
reasonable citizen would expect of them.194 Publisher liability in tort
assumes that the publisher has notice of the content of its
publications. It seems that imposing such a burden or expectation on
Craigslist-like entities would actually effect the kind of
over-deterrence that concerned Congress when it passed the CDA.19 5
Distributor liability, by contrast, requires the imposition of a
negligence or knowledge standard-only if the distributor knew or
had reason to know of the offensive content can the individual or
company be held liable for distributing it.196 One obvious objection to
this theory is that distributor liability would expose too many
defendants to the possibility of FHA suits. Another might be that
exposing ISPs to distributor liability would be a disincentive to the
1 See supra Part 111.
19 This Note's proposal is also intellectually "cleaner" than the idea of amending the CDA
to establish that ISPs are publishers only in the fair housing context. See Stephen Collins,
Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case for Amending the Communications
Decency Act, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471, 1495 (2008) (advancing a cogent argument for such an
amendment to the CDA). Amending the CDA to redefine ISPs as publishers only in this limited
context resolves the conflict between it and the FHA, but it may be intellectually dishonest. The
purpose of the CDA was to recognize the practical differences between ISPs and traditional
print media, and the small carve out argued for in Collins's comment would simply ignore those
practical differences. See also infra Part V.A.2 (further analyzing the contours of this proposal,
along with other CDA-amendment proposals).
94See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 578, 580B (1977) (declaring that
if an individual can legally be defined as a publisher, that person is liable for defamation under a
standard that approximates strict liability, though it might be "negligence minus"). This
argument assumes that by using the term "publish," the FHA meant to impose burdens on
persons that, under common law principles, could be held liable for publishing documents.
'
95 See generally 141 CONG. REC. 22,044-46 (1995) (statements of Reps. Cox and Wyden)
(stating that the CDA was not meant to interfere with the robust development of the Internet, but
was intended to provide an incentive for ISPs to protect their users from offensive material).
16See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977). At least one commentator has
suggested that a rule of negligence ought to apply in the case of cyberspace wrongs other than
copyright infringement. See Hylton, supra note 186, at 29-36 (explaining the applicability of
negligence standards, proximate cause, and last clear chance theories to cyberspace wrongs).
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creation of flagging systems by companies like Craigslist. But either
objection ignores the fact that the only alternative to imposing
distributor liability is to just hope that all ISPs voluntarily exhibit the
same responsibility that Craigslist does, even when the state of the
law may actually disincentivize them from doing anything at all.
Distributor liability balances the interests of the Internet industry
by providing a reasonably applicable standard, while protecting the
public from the harms of section 804(c) violations. Merely adding the
verb "distributes" to section 804(c)'s list of prohibitions may incur
some overbreadth and over-deterrence because a commonsense
understanding of the term would encompass far more individuals than
distributor liability under tort law. 19 7 Because of that statutory
construction issue, Congress would have to carefully craft new
language that incorporates the mental state necessary under tort
liability for distribution.
V. OTHER PROPOSALS AND OBJECTIONS
The problem of fair housing online has been a salient one at least
since the Craigslist case, though it was on the radar a few years
before.1 99 The CDA's provision of immunity against publisher
liability has also incited some scholarship independent of the concern
about fair housing.200 This section first addresses proposals made by
other commentators regarding this problem and then responds to
some likely objections to this Note's proposal.
A. Other Proposals
Proposals addressing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA
in the commentary can be divided into two broad categories. The first
argues that the conflict between the FHA and the CDA can be
eliminated through a judicial construction of the CDA that either
19 That is, a commonsense reading of the word "distribute" doesn't inhere the common
law limits on distributor liability. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. IV, at 867 (2d ed.
1989) (defining distribute to mean "deal out or bestow in portions or shares among a number of
recipients" or to "spread or disperse abroad through whole space or over a whole surface").
Although imputing the word "distribute" with the common law knowledge requirement would
limit its scope, Congress would have to be explicit about that imputation.
198 Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff'd, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
99 See Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The
Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 969 (2002).
20See, e.g., Robert G. Magee & Tae Hee Lee, Information Conduits or Content
Developers? Determining Whether News Portals Should Enjoy Blanket Immunity from
Defamation Suits, 12 Comm. L. & POL'Y 369, 369 (2007) (arguing that "[n]ews portals should
be held to the same standard for defamation liability as traditional print outlets").
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limits the immunity in all contexts or specifically eliminates it in the
FHA context. The second category argues that amending the CDA
will resolve the problem most efficiently.
1. Reading Immunity Out of the CDA at Least Within the FHA
Context
At least two commentators have argued that the apparent conflict
between the FHA and the CDA can be resolved by reading immunity
out of section 230(c)(1). 20 1 One commentator argues that, because the
CDA does not explicitly state that it overrides the FHA's advertising
provision, the courts must give effect to both statutes.202 The
argument rests on the foundation that repeals by implication are
disfavored, and that the baseline purposes of the two Acts may
coincide without contravening or effectively eliminating each
other.203 Although the commentator convincingly proceeds to explain
those assumptions and their validity, no courts have followed her
theory.
Another commentator suggests that because Congress's goal in
passing the CDA was protection, and because the language of the
statute repeatedly uses the words "protection for blocking and
screening," the statute was only intended to provide immunity for
removal, rather than immunity for doing anything or nothing at all. 204
The argument has some support in the legislative history and some in
the statutory text. Indeed, the proposal adeptly balances the interests
that Congress articulated in its deliberations concerning the CDA.205
Nonetheless, it has not been endorsed by any court.
2. Amending the CDA
After the well-explained and concededly logical pleas to interpret
the CDA's immunity provision fell on the courts' deaf ears, a new
round of commentary focused on amending the CDA to either
201 See Chang, supra note 199, at 1011; Kurth, supra note 102, at 835.
202 See Chang, supra note 199, at 1011 (arguing that "[e]nforcing the FHA's advertising
provisions against [ISPs] would not contravene § 230's principal goal of removing disincentives
to the private monitoring of online indecency," nor would it contravene other concerns
identified by courts, such as the "chilling of legitimate speech [or] the imposition of an
impossible burden on [ISPs]").2 03 See id (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)).
204 See Kurth, supra note 102, at 835.
205 See 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (explaining that his
amendment protects ISPs from liability while encouraging them to combat the perceived
Internet obscenity problem); see also supra Part LB (discussing the factual backdrop leading to
passage of the CDA and explaining the CDA's immunity grant).
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preclude immunity or expressly provide for it.206 One commentator
provides a theory for revision, arguing that section 230(c)(1) should
be rewritten to expressly allow suits against ISPs for violations of the
Fair Housing Act.207 While the revision is narrow and specific, it
assumes that the FHA's advertising provision is the only one worth
saving, even though other civil rights statutes contain similar
provisions.208 This Note's proposal similarly would only affect claims
under the FHA, but it does so by specifically amending the thwarted
legislation, rather than by amending the CDA, which applies to all
suits brought against ISPs.
Another suggested revision for protecting ISPs from suit, both in
the FHA context and other publisher liability contexts, centers around
altering the language in section 203(c)(1) concerning development of
content .2  The proposal would resolve some ambiguity in the text of
section 230(c)(1), but it would also likely eliminate the possibility of
asserting FHA claims. The suggestion is that to eliminate ambiguity,
Congress should strike out "development" from the CDA altogether
and broaden the immunity.210 The commentator concedes, however,
206 See Collins, supra note 193, at 1495 (proposing an amendment that would end ISP
immunity for discriminatory online housing advertisements while maintaining immunity for
other types of content that may be harder to identify); J. Andrew Crossett, Note, Unfair Housing
on the Internet: The Effect of the Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 73
Mo. L. REv. 195 (2008) (furthering no exact claim, but explaining that Congress should clarify
the discrepancy between the CDA and FHA through legislation); see also Eric Weslander, Case
Comment, Murky "Development": How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity Within the
Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry [Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)], 48
WASHBURN L.J. 267, 298 (2008) (explaining that an amendment to the CDA would solve the
ambiguity problem and arguing that Congress should "consider a creative way to balance the
interests of individuals against the interests of the Internet industry," and ultimately effectuate
unquestionably broad immunity for Internet intermediaries). Weslander suggests that the
distinction between the two leading cases on this issue-Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) and Fair Hous. Council
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)-is not
factual, but based upon the two courts differing interpretations of the CDA. See Weslander,
supra, at 294-95 (disagreeing with the 9th Circuit's interpretation of the term "development").
While the results of the two cases might suggest a circuit split because their analyses are not
identical, the factual dissimilarity between the defendants' roles as content developers likely
explains the difference in the results.207 See Collins, supra note 193, at 1495.
208 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2006) (prohibiting "any notice or advertisement
relating to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination).
209 See Weslander, supra note 206, at 297-98 (arguing that the decision in
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, creates a need to revise section 230(c)(1), and that the
development concept within the statute must be reexamined to effectuate congressional intent).21
oSee id at 297 (arguing that "Congress should at a minimum strike the words 'or
development' and 'in whole or in part' from the definition of information content provider in §
230").
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that if Congress determines that section 230(c)(1) immunity actually
goes too far, a different approach is warranted.2 1'
B. General Objections to ISP Liability in this Context212
1. Slippery Slopes
Whenever new technologies or new problems arise, proposals for
imposing restrictions on actors or conduct are almost always met with
slippery slope objections.2 13 In this context, the slippery slope
arguments might squarely address section 804(c) and similar speech
statutes or they might address the application of legal burdens to the
Web hosts at issue in the context of this Note. The slippery slope
arguments applying to the advertising provision itself are plain First
Amendment-protectionist arguments.214 The argument proceeds to say
that regulating against ISP liability would inevitably lead to
regulation "for every form of potentially regulated content and,
indeed, for all content as to which liability might be imposed."215
While reading the CDA differently might lead down that slippery
slope, it is not clear that specifically amending section 804(c) would
do the same. Of course, the fact that this Note suggests an expansion
of liability in an existing statute might be an example of falling down
the slippery slope that section 804(c) itself created. But this proposal
does not greatly expand the provisions of the FHA's advertising
provision. Rather, it finally accounts for the technological changes
that may be pushing section 804(c) into obsolescence.
2. First Amendment Problems
The First Amendment concerns often lodged against section
804(c) have not been well taken by the courts.2 16 A renter or seller
211 See id. at 298 (explaining that "Congress should take note of Chief Judge Kozinski's
statement that the Internet is no longer in danger of being 'smothered in the cradle,"' and that
perhaps an alternative approach would better effectuate congressional goals).
212 Another fairly simple argument is the "floodgates" argument, which is easily set forth
in the context of this Note's proposal for creating inroads for liability. The argument does not
deserve too much consideration, however, given the dearth of litigation on the issue.
213 For helpful background on slippery slope arguments, see Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1026 (2003) (explaining slippery slope
inefficiencies, and generally addressing the causes and effects of the slippery slope).
214 See infra Part V.B.2.
215 Kurth, supra note 102, at 831-32 (quoting Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendant at 11, Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. I. 2006) (No. 06-0657)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972) (explaining that
section 804(c) regulates purely commercial advertising and therefore does not unconstitutionally
limit First Amendment freedom of expression).
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may still express, in editorial fashion, that she disagrees with the Fair
Housing Act and that she believes in a strict segregationist society.
She is also not limited in her ability to say, "I hate [FHA-protected
minority group]." She is actually prohibited only from making or
causing to be made a notice, advertisement, or statement that would
tend to indicate to a protected person that they should not apply either
to rent or buy her property.2 17 The advertising provision does not
prevent a newspaper or an individual from expressing racist thoughts
as a general matter, as it does not amount to a general hate speech
prohibition.2 18  Section 804(c) "merely" prohibits invidious
discrimination in the housing marketplace. 2 19 Nonetheless, section
804(c) "is undeniably, in this narrow context, a content-based speech
restriction."2 20 To that extent, the provision could be subject to strict
scrutiny-a test that the provision likely would not satisfy22 1-but it
is likely exempted from that scrutiny because it only amounts to a
restriction on commercial speech.222 In the commercial speech area,
the contours of First Amendment protection are quite limited, and,
aside from applying section 804(c) to individuals otherwise exempted
under section 804(b), the FHA's fair advertising provision likely
survives constitutional inquiry.223
2 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
2 18 The fact that the FHA likely deters hate speech-and has, perhaps, a "chilling effect"-
is probably a welcome result in the eyes of the FHA's supporters, though it may be that the
chilling effect has some constitutional force in a slippery slope argument against general hate
speech legislation. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory,
145 U. PA. L. REv. 193, 246 (1996) (arguing that speech regulation can only lead to
impermissible governmental intrusions, and explaining that in a world with speech regulation,
"we must rely for our intellectual liberty on the wisdom, knowledge, moderation and good
judgment of politicians"). Contra Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional
Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 877-79 (1998) (disagreeing with Gey,
and arguing that "[iln some respects, the hate-speech controversy is the Plessy v. Ferguson of
our age," that indignity injuries are constitutional injuries under the Fourteenth Amendment that
must be balanced against perceived First Amendment injuries, and that the real question for
Congress and for the courts is "which interest is more morally significant" (footnote omitted)).
219 But see generally Schwemm, supra note 36, at 284-90 (comparing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), and explaining that
section 804(c) likely falls within the R.A. V. category of constitutionally prohibited restriction of
expression, rather than the Mitchell category of penalty enhancement based on insidious racial
or other bias motivating otherwise illegal conduct).
220 Schwemm, supra note 36, at 268.
221 See id (explaining that section 804(c) "would ordinarily be subjected to the highest
level of judicial scrutiny in a challenge based on the First Amendment, a level of scrutiny §
3604(c) would probably be unable to satisfy" but that section 804(c) should instead be analyzed
under the "commercial speech" doctrine).
222 See generally id. at 268-78 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)) (explaining that section 804(c) should be analyzed under the
Central Hudson test and that it would survive such a challenge).
m See generally id at 267-93 (explaining in great detail the various First Amendment
doctrines that could apply to section 804(c)). In his discussion of the First Amendment and
section 804(c), Robert G. Schwemni observes:
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3. Congress Should Regulate the Internet Only with Extreme
Caution/the Internet is Different
Some scholars argue that the Internet ought to be treated with
extreme caution by rule makers.2 24 The argument is that, because the
medium is so different from anything we have seen before, applying
what they might call "tired" rules of liability and decision would
frustrate growth in cyberspace. Underlying this perspective is the
assumption that there is some ideal set of rules that will spring up
organically as the Internet develops. However, the theory has a major
logical flaw that connotes a slippery slope problem: if we are still
waiting for these rules to form themselves after nearly two decades of
extensive development of the Internet and in cyberspace, then when
does the waiting end? Waiting for universal truths to spring up and
explain what legal rules ought to be employed presupposes that
Internet communication is sui generis. Attempting to approach new
technologies and media unsaddled by the baggage of old ones may
allow us to fully understand the new media's possibilities and
liberties of expression, as Marshall McLuhan would argue.225
Forgetting the slow-changing nature of the media's basic purposes
and roles,226 however, will prevent us from addressing serious societal
harms in reasonable ways. While a truly unsaddled view might lead to
the springing-up of rules naturally applicable to the Internet's big
players, it is possible to refashion traditional rules to suit the needs of
the newest technologies. Finally, as the Internet continues to develop
First Amendment challenge is only a concern in those few situations where the
discriminatory statement is made by an FHA-exempt housing provider and involves
non-racial discrimination not covered by the FHA or any other fair housing law,
because it is only in those situations that the speech would be unregulatable under
the commercial speech doctrine.
Id. at 289. That is, the only parties affected by section 804(c) that might be able to raise a First
Amendment defense are those protected under the "Mrs. Murphy" exceptions. One could argue
that, because the Internet is a special new space, even broader First Amendment protections
should inhere. As is explained in the next sub-part, however, Internet exceptionalism should
only be taken so far.
22 4 See generally Post, supra note 158 (discussing the development of Internet technologies
and ultimately rejecting the view that traditional rules may be fashioned to apply to those
technologies).
2 25 See MCLuHAN & FIORE, supra note 155, at 74-75 (discussing the "rear-view mirror"
problem where society looks at new media through the lens of the old).
2 26 See supra Part U1.B (discussing the Dog Poop Girl anecdote and arguing that Internet
media also "work us over completely," MCLUHAN & FIORE, supra note 155 at 26, just as
traditional media do).
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and replace traditional media, avoiding the need to regulate it will
become impossible.227
CONCLUSION
Returning to the opening song, this Note could not express a more
opposing view to the one espoused by Everyone's a Little Bit
Racist.22 8 Rather than approach the polemic of hate speech from the
semi-laissez-faire perspective that harmony will be achieved by just
getting over it and accepting it as embedded in the fabric of our
society, society should defy the construction of discursive structures
that reinforce tired stereotypes and racial stigmas. Prohibiting the use
of noxious language-at least in the limited commercial context
subject to government regulation-combats the injurious effects of
racial caricaturization.
To achieve this end, the FHA's advertising provision must be
saved from evisceration by the increasing development of the Internet
coupled with the immunity provided to ISPs under the CDA.
Although other commentators have suggested attempting to read the
immunity out of the CDA or simply redrafting the immunity
provisions, these solutions are not enough. On the contrary, amending
the FHA to include publisher and distributor liability for
discriminatory advertisements either published or distributed by ISPs
is the only way to truly ensure that the advertising provision will not
become a dead letter in the digital age.
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